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Because of the length and complexity of this subject, I have
limited this paper to cases involving civil practice and procedure in
the courts. Thus I have omitted cases involving administrative law
or procedure and criminal procedure, which are reviewed elsewhere
herein by other members of the Bar. Nor have I reviewed the sta-
tutes recently enacted by our General Assembly which affect pro-
cedure. These are included in an excellent summary of new acts
published in the 1955 Summer Edition of the Law Quartrly.l
There is little continuity in this subject and little connection be-
tween the various matters affecting procedure which I discuss herein-
after. For this reason I have divided this paper into three main
parts: first, Actions and Proceedings; second, Trial and Judgment;
and third, Appeal and Review.
In the first part, I have included cases on Certiorari, Contempt,
Declaratory Judgments; and Proceedings for Separate Support and
Maintenance, for Attorneys Fees Against Attachment Bonds, and to
Reopen Judgments. Also, I have reviewed cases relating to Service
of Process.
In the second part, Trial and Judgments, I have grouped cases re-
lating to Venue, Jurisdiction of Judge of Adjoining Circuit, Right to
Framed Issues in Equity Cases, Right to Jury Trial in Law Cases,
and Voir Dire Examination of Jurors on Insurance connections. In
addition, cases are cited on the Admissibility of a Deposition Whose
Informality is Covered by Stipulation; Power of the Court to Order
a Witness to Testify; Waiver of Objection by Cross-examination
Without Reservation; and Intervention of Parties in an In Rem Pro-
ceeding. Finally under this heading are cases on Voluntary Non-suit
as a Matter of Right, Reopening Case, and Conduct of Counsel.
Under Appeal and Review is first a general discussion of matters
in which the Supreme Court has or has not exercised its original
or appellate jurisdiction. This is followed by a section on Scope
of Review, which in turn includes several subsections, and finally a
case on Settlement of Record for Appeal.
Under Scope of Review in Part 3, I have assembled cases under
the following subheadings (several of which are still further sub-
divided): Review when Points not Made Below or in Exceptions,
OMember of firm of McKay and McKay, Columbia, S. C.
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or When Objections Are Not Timely Made. Also, Orders Which
are not Appealable. Finally I have listed those cases relating to the
Supreme Court's Review of Facts in Equity Cases, of Findings of
Master Concurred in by Circuit Judge, and of Claims that Damages
are Excessive.
I. ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. Certiorari
Two cases on certiorari illustrate instances in which the writ will
be allowed or refused.
In Breeden v. S. C. Democratic Executive Committee2 the peti-
tioner sought review of the action of the Executive Committee in
declaring respondent nominee of the Primary. In answer to respon-
dent's contention that actions of the Executive Committee were not
reviewable in the absence of fraud or bad faith, the court said:
Under our decisions primary elections have been given a legal
status and it has long been recognized that any person interested
in an election has a right to seek relief in the Courts when the
tribunals designated by the party for the decision of controver-
sies have not proceeded according to law . .. . While we have
no right to review disputed testimony, we are empowered to cor-
rect any error of law made by the party tribunals and may also
examine the facts for the purpose of determining whether their
findings have any evidentiary support .... In the instant case
the facts are undisputed. The questions presented are purely
of a legal nature, which unquestionably this Court has jurisdic-
tion to determine. (Citations omitted.)
The court also held that the justice of the court to whom the peti-
tion was first presented must determine initially whether the petition
complied with Rule 20 of the court so as to move the Supreme Court
to assume original jurisdiction.
In Dunbar v. City of Spartanburg3 petitioner sought certiorari to
review the actions of City Council in refusing a rezoning application.
The Supreme Court held that the Council's action in refusing to
modify its zoning law was legislative rather than judicial, and the
Court could not compel legislative action.
At common law and under the practice of most jurisdictions
writs of certiorari will lie to review only those acts which are
judicial or quasi-judicial in nature. It does not lie to review
2. 226 S.C. 204, 84 S.E. 2d 723 (1954).
3. 85 S.E. 2d 281 (S.C. 1955).
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or annul any judgment or proceeding which is legislative, execu-
tive or ministerial rather than judicial. The writ does not lie
to review the actions of an inferior tribunal or board in the exer-
cise of purely legislative functions. (Emphasis mine.)
The court also cited petitioner's failure to pursue his remedy at
law provided by the zoning ordinance as an additional ground for
denying the writ.
B. Contempt Proceedings
In Long v. McMillan,4 the defendants, officials of the State High-
way Department, appealed an order of the circuit judge ruling them
in contempt. Defendants had disciplined two highway patrolmen for
failing to turn into the Highway Department a pistol seized in an
arrest. The patrolmen had previously been informally instructed by
the trial judge, after the trial of the gun's owner, to hold the gun
pending further order of the court. The Supreme Court reversed
the trial judge holding:
After the case of State v. Stacey Huggins was ended, Corporal
Crawford inquired informally of the Judge as to what disposi-
tion should be made of the pistol he had received from Huggins.
The Judge's response can in no wise be considered a valid and
binding order of the Court in the Huggins case as that case had
been ended ..... but was more of an oral directive in the form
of advice which Crawford had sought for his own benefit. There
was no open announcement in Court, no notation thereabout
entered in the minutes, or anything done which would make
such a part of the records of the Court. (Omissions mine.)
C. Declaratory Judgment- Sufficiency of Complaint
In Foster v. Foster- plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment to de-
termine the rights and estates of the various parties under a will. Cer-
tain defendants demurred that the complaint did not set out a cause of
action. The lower court overruled the demurrer and the Supreme
Court sustained it, saying:
The Complaint here states the facts from which it is apparent
that a justiciable controversy, actual or potential, between the
respondents on the one hand and the appellants on the other,
exists as to their respective rights and estates under Item 4 of
the Will .... The question now is not whether the construction
advanced by the respondents is correct, but whether they are en-
4. 86 S.E. 2d 477 (S.C. 1955).
5. 226 S.C. 130, 83 S.E. 2d 752 (1954).
[Vol. 8
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titled to have the Will construed . . . "The test of sufficiency
of such a complaint is not whether it shows that the plaintiff is
entitled to a declaration of rights in accordance with his theory,
but whether he is entitled to a declaration of rights at all. Even
though the plaintiff is on the wrong side of the controversy, if
he states the existence of a controversy which should be settled
by the Court under the declaratory judgment law, he has stated
a cause of suit.'
'.. If rights are so clear that there is no uncertainty or dispute
as to them, a demurrer upon that ground would lie. But where
the Complaint in such an action does not seek affirmative relief,
a demurrer cannot properly be addressed to it on the ground
that the facts alleged would not legally support a judgment sus-
taining the claim of the plaintiff, because he does not claim direct
relief, but only a declaration of his rights.' (Emphasis and omis-
sions mine.)
D. Proceeding for Separate Support and Maintenance- Grounds
In Forester v. Forester6 the Supreme Court said:
There is no statute in this state undertaking to fix the grounds
for separate maintenance and support. This is left to the broad
discretion of the Court of Equity ....
The grounds upon which alimony should be allowed are best
stated in Wise v. Wise, 60 S.C. 447, 38 S.E. 794, 802, after a
review of the decisions in this State: "(1) Desertion of the
wife by the husband, without just cause . . . . (2) Where the
husband inflicts upon his wife, or threatens her with, bodily in-
jury, amounting to the saevitia of the civil law, which is defined
'to be personal violence actually inflicted or menaced, and affect-
ing life or health.' (3) Where the husband practices such ob-
scene and revolting indecencies in the family circle, and so out-
rages all the sentiments of delicacy and refinement characteris-
tic of the sex that a modest and pure-minded woman would find
these grievances more dreadful and intolerable than the most
cruel inflictions upon her person." (Omissions mine.)
E. Proceeding Against Attachment Bond - Attorney's Fee
In Knighton v. Bramlett7 the plaintiffs sued defendants as prin-
cipal and surety on an attachment bond to recover attorney's fees
and damages. Earlier, in another proceeding, the defendants had
attached an automobile, and the attachment was dissolved on the
6. 226 S.C. 311, 85 S.E. 2d 187 (1954).
7. 226 S.C. 133, 83 S.E. 2d 753 (1954).
1955]
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ground it had been improperly issued. The court held that reasonable
attorney's fees were allowed in actions against plaintiffs' attachment
bond, if the attachment was dissolved, and also, that it was not
necessary that these claims be asserted in the proceeding to dissolve
the attachment.
Suit on the bond could only be brought in a subsequent cause
of action by service of a summons and complaint upon the prin-
cipal and surety, as no cause of action on the bond existed until
the dissolution of the attachment.
F. Proceeding to Reopen Judgment - Mistake or Excusable Neglect
In Marthers v. Hurst8 the defendant moved to reopen a judgment
which had been taken against him when he undertook to handle his
own case, and was absent when it was tried.
Upholding the lower court's denial of the motion, the Supreme
Court said:
It is well established that a motion of this kind is addressed
to the sound discretion of the Circuit Judge whose ruling will
not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of
discretion . . . . It is equally well settled that it is incumbent
upon the party seeking relief under this section to show (1) that
the Judgment was taken against him 'through his mistake, in-
advertence, surprise, or excusable neglect'; and (2) that he
has a meritorious defense.
We need not consider the question of meritorious defense, for
it clearly appears that there was no abuse of discretion on the
part of Judge Moss in holding that appellant had failed to show
excusable neglect. (Emphasis mine.)
However, in Brock v. Brock,9 the Supreme Court reversed the
lower court on the ground that it had abused its discretion in allow-
ing the defendant to reopen the judgment which had been taken
against him in a divorce action. The record disclosed that defen-
dant had completely disregarded all proceedings in the lower court
and all orders which had been served upon him until after the decree
of divorce bad been rendered. When he then moved to vacate the
decree, his motion was granted by the lower court. The Supreme
Court, citing Section 10-1213,10 which allows the lower court, in its
discretion, to reopen the judgment taken against a party "through
his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect", said:
8. 86 S.E. 2d 581 (S.C. 1955).
9. 225 S.C. 261, 81 S.E. 2d 898 (1954).
10. CODE OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952.
[Vol. 8
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The foregoing section is an exclusive remedy and takes the place
of a petition for rehearing or a bill of review ....
The affidavit not only fails to support respondent's contention
that the judgment was entered through mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect, but it reveals that respondent
failed to exercise the slightest care. Therefore, there was a lack
of due diligence as required by law. . and this court has held
that one who is wilfully or inexcusably in defaulP deserves no
consideration from the court. (Emphasis and omissions mine.)
G. Service of Process
In Foster v. Morrison11 the court held that after a foreign cor-
poration, previously domesticated in South Carolina, had formally
withdrawn from the State and did no business here, service of pro-
cess upon the Secretary of State of South Carolina could not confer
state court jurisdiction when the cause of action arose in a foreign
State.
In Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Manos Brothers, Inc.12 the court held a
Georgia divorce invalid because the defendant in that proceeding
had not been properly served by publication as required by the laws
of Georgia, and that proper service is essential for jurisdiction of
the defendant.
The well established rule is that when a constructive service by
publication is relied upon the published notice must correctly
identify the parties to the action and accurately state their names,
especially that of the defendant upon whom service is thus
thought to be mde ....
In answer to the contention that the idem sonans doctrine might
be applied where the name of the party to be served was misspelled,
the court said:
The doctrine of idem sonans is not properly applicable ht di-
vorce cases, for the obvious reason that the plaintiff well knows
the true name of the defendant ....
'The corrupt practices in divorce proceedings could hardly be
aided by the Court's better than to open the door for a variance
between the actual name of the defendant in the records and
that in the notice constituting the service and giving the Court's
jurisdiction.' (Emphasis and omissions mine.)
11. 226 S.C. 149, 84 S.E. 2d 344 (1954).
12. 226 S.C. 257, 84 S.E. 2d 857 (1954).
1955]
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II. TRIAL AND JUDGMENT
A. Venue
In each of the cases discussed below the Supreme Court empha-
sized the principle that findings by the trial judge on motions for
change of venue will not be disturbed if sustained by evidence in the
absence of the showing of manifest abuse of discretion. It is the
application of this principle which explains the apparent difference
in result of some of the cases herein cited.
The grounds for change of venue considered in the cases are (1)
convenience of witnesses and promotion of the ends of justice, and
(2) residence of the defendant. The confusion arises where one
party relies on one ground and his adversary on the other. The re-
sults in the cases cited indicate that the first ground is the stronger.
In McKinney v. Noland Co.13 the accident occurred in Greenville
County where plaintiff and most of the witnesses to the accident and
subsequent events resided. Suit was brought in Spartanburg Coun-
ty where the individual and corporate defendants resided, and plain-
tiff moved for a change of venue to Greenville. The Supreme Court
sustained the order of the lower court, changing the place of trial to
Greenville from the county of defendant's residence, on the ground
that the plaintiff had made a sufficient showing as to convenience of
witnesses, etc. and the findings of the trial judge were not unsup-
ported by evidence, nor an abuse of discretion.
However, in Rice v. Hartness Bottling Works,14 the court again
affirmed the trial judge, although a contrary result was reached. Plain-
tiff, a resident of Richland County, brought suit against the defen-
dant corporation in Spartanburg County for an accident which oc-
curred in Union County. Plaintiff moved to change venue to Union
County on the grounds of convenience of witnesses, etc. and on the
ground that a fair and impartial trial could not be had in Spartanburg
County. The Supreme Court reiterated that the decision of the trial
judge "will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear
showing of abuse of discretion amounting to manifest error of law"
and held that there was no showing that a fair and impartial trial
could not be had in Spartanburg County or that the convenience of
witnesses, etc. would be seriously impaired. Plaintiff had urged that
the police officers who investigated the wreck and certain eye wit-
nesses resided in Union County. Plaintiff also was hospitalized there.
Defendant argued that its corporation offices and agents were in
Spartanburg County, one of its eye-witnesses resided there, as did
13. 86 S.E. 2d 807 (S.C. 1955).
14. 86 S.E. 2d 67 (S.C. 1955).
[Vol. 8
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the operator of the wrecker which brought in plaintiff's car, and that
it was important that a Spartanburg jury pass upon the credibility of
the defendant's witnesses.
In Warren v. Padgett,15 plaintiff, a resident of Hampton County,
brought suit in Hampton County for injuries received there against
a resident of Hampton County and a resident of Jasper County.
The Jasper County resident, Padgett, moved to change the venue to
his home county on the grounds of his residence and averred that
his co-defendant, Fuller, was joined malafide in order to hold the
case in Hampton County. Padgett charged that Fuller had defaulted
and could not respond to judgment. The trial court denied the mo-
tion for change of venue and the Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court saying:
The right of a resident defendant to trial in the county of his
residence has been aptly described by this Court as a substantial
right . . . and he who asserts the right to sue a defendant in a
county other than his residence must at least balance the testi-
mony showing such right of departure . . . . and it becomes
necessary to determine the question of whether or not a defen-
dant is a bona fide defendant or an immaterial one merely
joined for the purpose of permitting the action to be tried in a
county other than that of the residence of the real defendant.
The court held that even though the Hampton County defendant
could not respond to judgment and had defaulted, there was no suffici-
ent showing that a real claim did not exist against him.
In Trawick v. One 1952 International Pickup, etc.16 venue was not
involved, but rather the right of the owner of a motor vehicle sued
in rein to intervene as a party defendant. However, the following
dictum by the court is of interest on the question of venue:
Conceivably the order of intervention may prevent a multiplici-
ty of actions, and this is not a case where the issue of venue
may be raised, since respondent and appellant are residents of
the same county. However, if the question of venue were pre-
sent, appellant would not be deprived of his right to complete
his action in rein against the defending vehicle in the county of
attachment . . . . (Emphasis mine.)
Finally, in Bruner v. Seaboard Airline R. Co. 17 the Supreme Court
affirmed the trial judge's order transferring the place of trial from
15. 225 S.C. 447, 82 S.E. 2d 810 (1954).
16. 225 S.C. 321, 82 S.E. 2d 275 (1954).
17. 226 S.C. 177, 84 S.R. 2d 557 (1954).
1955]
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Darlington County to Richland County. In that case plaintiff sued
under the Federal Employer's Liability Act for injuries received ill
Georgia. There were no witnesses in Darlington County, most wit-
nesses being residents of Georgia. The Supreme Court held there
was no manifest abuse of discretion by the trial judge in finding that
the convenience of witnesses, including out of state witnesses, would
be better served by requiring them to attend trial in Richland County,
which the Georgia witnesses could reach by defendant's main line,
and where plaintiff himself resided.
B. Jurisdiction, Judge of Adjoining Circuit
In Peoples National Bank v. Manos Brothers, JnC.18 the resident
judge disqualified himself and one of the parties moved to bring the
matter before the judge of the adjoining circuit, serving notice on
the adverse parties, but without filing the necessary affidavit that
there was no judge resident or special within the circuit. The case
was heard, all parties being represented, by the judge of the adjoin-
ing circuit and he, after hearing, notified the parties of the non-filing
of the affidavit which was then filed nunc pro tunc. After the judge
had ruled on the case one defendant objected that he lacked jurisdic-
tion because the affidavit was not filed at the time of hearing. The
Supreme Court held that the affidavit did not create jurisdictioti, but
was merely evidence of it and could be filed nunc pro tunc.
C. Right to Franmed Issues in Equity Cases
In Greenwood Lumber Co. v. Cromer19 plaintiff sought inter alia
to restrain defendants from disposing of certain property. One de-
fendant contended that a deed was given by her under alleged ddress
and should be set aside. She moved before the trial judge for aft
order framing issues for the jury on her cross-action to set aside the
deed. The trial judge, having ordered a general reference, denied
defendant's motion and she appealed. The Supreme Court sustained
the lower court on the ground that in an equity case it was in the
discretion of the trial judge to determine whether or not to frame is-
sues for a jury, and that this discretion had been properly exercised by
the lower court.
D. Right to Jury Trial- Law Cases
In Legette v. Snith20 plaintiffs proceeded under the Declaratory
Judgment Act to bar defendant from inheriting from the estate of
his wife whom he had accidentally shot while trying to kill another.
18. 226 S.C. 257, 84 S.E. 2d 857 (1954).
19. 225 S.C. 375, 82 S.E. 2d 527 (1954).
20. 85 S.E. 2d 576 (S.C. 1955).
[Vol. &-
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The judge submitted the factual issue to the jury, which found for
the defendant. Thereafter the judge granted judgment non obstante
veredicto for plaintiffs, and defendant appealed. The Supreme
Court, reversing the lower court, said:
An issue that is essentially one at law is not transformed into
an equitable one by the fact that declaratory rather than investive
relief is sought ....
Had appellant commenced an action against respondents for the
possession of his portion of the estate, it cannot be doubted that
he and they would have been entitled to a jury trial as a matter
of right, the issues being essentially legal and not equitable ....
Respondents cannot, by invoking the declaratory judgment pro-
cedure and thus reversing the position of the parties, deprive
him of his constitutional right. The factual issues being legal in
character, their determination by the jury was conclusive on the
trial judge. It matters not that appellant's demand that they
be determined by a jury was made under the mistaken belief
that the action was in equity rather than at law. The trial judge
properly viewed it as one at law, and so submitted the issues to
the jury. (Emphasis and omissions mine.)
In Turner v. Byars2l plaintiff sought partition of realty and one
of the defendants who occupied the premises claimed title under a
contract of sale and prayed specific performance thereof. This de-
fendant objected to the matter being referred to the Master. The
court said:
Appellant contends he is entitled to a jury trial. Undoubtedly
he would be if the basic issues were purely legal in nature and
the contest related solely to title. But there is no contest as to
the holder of the legal title .... Appellant's claim is based upon
an alleged contract to purchase from these heirs. He seeks
specific performance of that contract - equitable relief. Under
these circumstances we think a general order of reference was
proper ....
E. Voir Dire Examination of Jurors - Insurance
In Wood v. England22 plaintiff sued for injuries in an automobile
accident, and asked that the jury venire be examined on voir dire as
to their connection, if any, with certain insurance companies. The
trial judge denied the request and plaintiff appealed.
21. 85 S.E. 2d 100 (1955).
22. 226 S.C. 73, 83 S.E. 2d 644 (1954).
19551
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The Supreme Court held that the record did not evidence that any
insurance company was involved in the case,
. . . hence there is no showing that appellant was in anywise
prejudiced by the ruling of the trial judge under the circum-
stances in denying the request and no abuse of discretion in the
absence of which the order appealed from should be affirmed.
The court also noted that it was a long standing principle in such
cases as this that reference to insurance in evidence or argument was
ground for mistrial; and that to inform the jury before-hand that
insurance might protect one of the parties would tend to carry the
jury away from the real issues and lead them to regard carelessly
the rights of the defendant on the ground that someone else would
have to pay the verdict.
F. Deposition - Admissibility Where Informality Covered by Stipu-
lations
In Adams v. Willis23 plaintiff sought specific performance of an
option to purchase realty, and objection was raised as to existence of
evidence to prove notice of renewal of lease containing the option.
Evidence to prove this fact was contained in a deposition to which
defendant had objected on the ground that it had not been mailed
to the Clerk of Court, and was in other respects irregular. The Su-
preme Court, holding the deposition admissible, said:
However valid these objections might be in an ordinary case,
in this action a stipulation had been entered into between the
parties. Notice of the taking of the deposition had been given
by the respondents, setting forth the time and place . . . . At-
torneys for the appellant consented to the time and place of tak-
ing the ddposition, and further stipulated that, 'same shall be
mailed by the above named notary public to E. Inman, Special
Referee . .. .'
Ordinarily, a deposition is sent to the Clerk of Court, but here
it was mailed to the Special Referee by agreement. In view of
the stipulation we think that the trial judge correctly held that
there was a substantial compliance with the statutory require-
ments, and that the deposition was admissible. (Omissions
mine.)
G. Power of Court to Order Witness to Testify
In Greenwood Lumber Co. v. Cromer2 4 the trial judge denied a
23. 225 S.C. 518, 83 S.E. 2d 171 (1954).
24. 225 S.C. 375, 82 S.E. 2d 527 (1954).
[Vol. 8
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motion to frame issues and ordered a general reference, directing one
defendant to appear before the Master after 10 days notice, and prior
to the reference, to answer questions of the Master or the plaintiff.
This defendant appealed the order, alleging that it violated the pro-
visions of the State and Federal Constitutions protecting him from
self-incrimination. The Supreme Court sustained the trial judge,
holding:
A trial Court of course has inherent power to require the ap-
pearance of witnesses even as Counsel for either side may require
the presence and testimony of witnesses. The protection af-
forded by the rule against self-incrimination may not be injected
to invalidate a subpoena or the Court's order to appear. An
Order in this case, or the subpoena in some other case, is not
invalid merely because of the possibility that the witness sought
to be questioned may possibly be asked some question, the ans-
wer to which might tend to incriminate him. Were the rule
otherwise, each witness might determine for himself whether or
not he should answer a subpoena to the Court and could refuse
to appear because he felt he might be asked some question the
answer to which would incriminate him, even though his fears
be purely imaginary.
H. Waiver of Objection by Cross-Examination Without Reservation
In Richardson v. Register25 the exception to which the court applied
this ruling is not set out. However, the following excerpt from the
opinion is important to trial counsel.
One of these witnesses also testified over objection that he had
long ago cut poles on the disputed area thinking that it was land
of Johnson, plaintiff's grantor; but he was cross-examined with-
out rese'rvation on the same subject, which renders exception
thereto untenable. (Emphasis mine.)
In this connection, see also Munn v. Asseff26 where the Court ob-
served:
There was no objection of consequence to the testimony support-
ing all allegations of the Complaint, and defense counsel cross-
examined plaintiff's witnesses freely on all issues without reser-
vation ....
but denied new trial on other grounds.
25. 87 S.E. 2d 40 (S.C. 1955).
26. 226 S.C. 54, 83 S.E. 2d 642 (1954).
1955]
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I. Intervention of Parties
In Trawick v. One 1952 International Pickup, etc.27 plaintiff
brought an action in ren for damages against defendant's truck and
the truck owner moved to intervene as a party defendant. The trial
judge ordered the owner to be made a party and directed plaintiff to
serve an amended complaint on the owner, allowing her 20 days in
which to file an answer. The plaintiff appealed and the Supreme
Court, reversing the lower court in part, held:
The Circuit Court has the right to permit an owner to intervene
in an action in ren and set up his rights to the attached vehicle,
but an order of intervention should not require an amendment
of the pleadings, for, as stated heretofore, it may be that a
cause of action does not exist against the intervenor.
J. Voluntary Nonsuit as a Matter of Right
In Wildhagen v. Ayers28 plaintiffs failed to comply with the court
order to make the complaint more definite and certain within 30 days
and applied to the Circuit Court for additional time in which to com-
ply which was denied. Plaintiffs then immediately moved for an
order allowing them to take a voluntary non-suit, without prejudice,
but the trial judge, after hearing on the motion, struck their com-
plaint because of plaintiffs' failure to comply with his prior order,
and by implication denied the motion for voluntary non-suit. Plain-
tiffs appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed the lower court on
two grounds. First, that there was no motion by the defendant for
dismissal of the complaint and the only matter before the court was
appellant's motion for non-suit; second, there was no showing that
the defendant would be prejudiced by allowing plaintiff to take a
voluntary non-suit and plaintiffs' motion therefore should have been
granted. The court said:
The rule which has been established by our decisions since the
code . . . is that the granting of a voluntary nonsuit is within the
discretion of the Court but denial of a motion therefor is not dis-
creet in the absence of some good reason for resultant prejudice
to the defendant . . . . Moreover, the discretionary power of
the Court is called into action only where the circumstances are
such that a termination of the action would be unjust or inequi-
table to the legal rights of defendant or others. (Emphasis and
omissions mine.)
27. 225 S.C. 321, 82 S.E. 2d 275 (1954).
28. 225 S.C. 384, 82 S.E. 2d 609 (1954).
[Vol. 8
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K. Reopening Case
In Smith v. Jasper County Board of Education2 9 the Supreme
,Court overruled appellant's exception that the trial judge erred in
allowing plaintiff to introduce additional testimony after she had
closed her case.
Plaintiff-respondent closed her evidence and appellant moved
for non-suit, whereupon the Court on its own motion reopened
plaintiff's case and allowed her to put in additional -testimony.
Ordinarily, as here, that was within the discretion of the Court,
and no abuse is shown .... (Emphasis mine.)
L. Conduct of Counsel
In Belue v. City of Greenville30 appellant contended inter alia that
the trial judge erred in not granting a mis-trial on the ground that
plaintiff's counsel persisted in asking his witnesses leading questions.
The court observed:
During the examination of respondent's witnesses, counsel for
appellant interposed frequent objections to the form of the ques-
tions asked by respondent's counsel; and these objections were,
in most instances, sustained, the Court cautioning opposing coun-
sel against leading his witnesses. Even where the trial Court
has permitted leading questions, reversal for that cause rarely
follows, and then only when it appears that the judicial discre-
tion within which such matters apparently rest, has been abused,
and prejudice has resulted . .. No such showing is made here.
(Omissions mine.)
In Nelson v. Charleston & Western Carolina Rwy. Co.3 1 defendant
excepted to the failure of the lower court to order mistrial on ground
that the argument of plaintiff's counsel to the jury was improper and
highly prejudicial. The Supreme Court said:
As this case is being remanded for a new trial on other grounds,
it is not necessary that we pass directly upon these exceptions,
and we shall not do so. We cannot pass unnoticed, however, the
fact, apparent from the record, that after the trial judge had
ruled such argument improper and admonished counsel to desist
from it, he repeatedly persisted in returning to it. Regardless
of the correctness or incorrectness of the trial judge's ruling as
to the impropriety of counsel's argument, the ruling had been
made, and it was highly improper of counsel to disregard it.
29. 86 S.E. 2d 738 (S.C. 1955).
30. 226 S.C. 192, 84 S.E. 2d 631 (1954).
31. 86 S.E. 2d 56 (S.C. 1955).
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III. APPEAL AND REVIEW
A. IN GENERAL
The following cases reviewed again under this sub-article are more
fully covered elsewhere. They are considered chiefly for the purpose
of classifying the grounds on which the Supreme Court has exercised
or declined to exercise its original or appellate jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court exercised its original jurisdiction by certiorari
to review errors of law of the governing tribunal of a political party
in declaring a party nominee in Breeden v. S. C. Democratic Execu-
tive Committee,32 but declined to issue the writ to review the action
of a city counsel in refusing to alter its zoning ordinances in Dunbar
v. City of Spartanburg.83 The distinction between the two cases was
that the subject reviewed in the first case was judicial, whereas the
subject whose review was declined in the second case was legislative.
In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court de-
clined to give relief in those matters lying within the trial court's
discretion, absent an abuse of discretion. On this ground it declined
to set aside orders of the lower courts granting or denying change
of venue in McKinney v. Noland Company,3 4 Rice v. Hartness Bott-
ling Works, 5 Warren v. Padgett,36 and Bruner v. Seaboard Air Line
Railroad Co.3 7 Again it declined to interfere with the lower court's
exercise of its discretion in refusing to frame issues for the jury in an
equity case, Greenwood Lumber Co. v. Cromer, 8s or its denial of a
motion to question the jury venire on voir dire as to the members' con-
nection with certain insurance companies not involved in the case of
Wood v. England.3 9 Again it confirmed the trial court's discretion to
allow plaintiff to reopen her case and put in additional evidence after
she had closed. Smith v. Jasper County Board of Education.
40
However, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the lower court
denying plaintiff the right to take a voluntary non-suit on the ground
that the denial constituted an abuse of discretion where the rights of
the defendant would not have been prejudiced. Wildhagen v.
Ayers.4 1
The Supreme Court affirmed the complaining party's right to a
32. 226 S.C. 204, 84 S.E. 2d 723 (1954).
33. 85 S.E. 2d 281 (S.C. 1955).
34. 86 S.E. 2d 807 (S.C. 1955).
35. 86 S.E. 2d 67 (S.C. 1955).
36. 225 S.C. 447, 82 S.E. 2d 810 (1954).
37. 226 S.C. 177, 84 S.E. 2d 557 (1954).
38. 225 S.C. 375, 82 S.E. 2d 527 (1954).
39. 226 S.C. 73, 83 S.E. 2d 644 (1954).
40. 86 S.E. 2d 738 (S.C. 1955).
41. 225 S.C. 384, 82 S.E. 2d 609 (1954).
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jury trial on law questions in a declaratory judgment proceeding,
Legette v. Smith,42 but held that the appellant had no right to a jury
trial where the question involved was in equity. Turner v. Byars.43
B. ScoPE or RivIw
1. Points Not Raised Below or in Exceptions
The Supreme Court will not review matters where the complain-
ing party has not preserved his rights in the lower court and an ap-
peal. Thus it will not consider points not presented or objected to
below, or not included in exceptions on appeal. Furthermore, it will
not pass upon exceptions which are too general to raise the point
of error.
In Carroway v. Carolina Power & Light Co.4 4 plaintiff appealed
from a direction of verdict for the defendant, and asked the Supreme
Court to consider and apply to the case a statute which had not been
brought before the lower court. The Supreme Court said, "This we
decline to do because this code section was not presented to or con-
sidered by the court below. It is, therefore, not properly before us."
In Miller v. Miller45 where defendant, in proceeding for divorce
a mensa et thoro, on appeal argued that plaintiff was not entitled to
alimony because of her refusal to accept a bona fide offer by defen-
dant to take her back and resume marital relations, the Supreme Court
said:
This question does not appear to have been raised in the court
below. Not only was no offer of this kind made in the answer,
but on the contrary, appellant alleged that 'it is impossible for
the parties to reside together as husband and wife.' This de-
fense is not mentioned in the Master's Report, appellant's excep-
tions to this report or in the circuit decree. It cannot be raised
here for the first time.
In Nelson v. Charleston and Western Carolina Railway Co.46 the
defendant inter alia excepted that the trial judge erred in failing to
hold that the verdict as to actual and punitive damages "was exces-
sive". The Supreme Court held that when a verdict was merely un-
duly liberal, the trial judge alone has the power to set it aside or to
reduce it by granting new trial nisi. On the other hand, where dam-
ages are so grossly excessive as to indicate the jury was influenced
by passion or prejudice, or other improper considerations, it is the
42. 85 S.E. 2d 576 (S.C. 1955).
43. 85 S.E. 2d 100 (S.C. 1955).
44. 226 S.C. 237, 84 S.E. 2d 728 (1954).
45. 225 S.C. 274, 82 S.E. 2d 119 (1954).
46. 86 S.E. 2d 56 (S.C. 1955).
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duty of the trial court or the Supreme Court to set it aside absolutely.
The court implied that the exception as to damages in this case was
not sufficiently explicit to raise the point of error saying: ""The
language of the exception, which charges merely that the verdict
'was excessive' is not such as to raise the issue that it is of the second
class; and with the first we have no concern."
In Peoples National Bank v. Manos Brothers, I1c.47 the Supreme
Court refused to consider appellant's argument objecting to non-
joinder of certain parties.
This contention is not embodied in any of appellant's excep-
tions, and is therefore not entitled to consideration. Further-
more, the objection of non-joinder was not made in the lower
court, and is not available when made for the first time here.
Again, on another objection, the Court said:
In their brief, appellant's counsel urged that the testimony of
the witness should not have been considered because the inter-
preter was not sworn. The point was not raised by any excep-
tion, and therefore will not be considered. (Emphasis mine.)
In Zemp Const. Co. v. Harmon Brothers Const. Co.48 the defen-
dant objected at the trial to the court's allowing parol evidence to
explain a written instrument but included no exception to the ruling
in his appeal. The Supreme Court said: "The correctness of this
ruling is not before us because no exception was taken to it." In the
same case the court passing upon appellant's exceptions to the failure
of the trial court to direct a verdict or order judgment non obstante
veredicto said:
"... This Court is confined to the sole issue of whether it was
error to refuse appellant's motion for direction of a verdict on the
ground on which such motion was rested at the trial." (Emphasis
mine.)
In Hall v. Walters4 9 the court held that the motion for judgment
non obstante veredicto was properly overruled under Circuit Court
Rule No. 79 where defendants had not previously moved for direction
of verdict.
In Marthers v. Hurst50 defendant appealed inter alia from a judg-
ment for punitive damages but the Supreme Court said:
There was no motion for a nonsuit or directed verdict either
47. 226 S.C. 257, 84 S.E. 2d 857 (1954).
48. 225 S.C. 361, 82 S.E. 2d 531 (1954).
49. 85 S.E. 2d 729 (S.C. 1955).
50. 86 S.E. 2d 581 (S.C. 1955).
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as to actual or punitive damages. This precludes appellant from
raising now any question as to the sufficiency of the evidence
... . It is true that due to appellant's negligence, he was not
present at the trial nor represented by counsel, but this did not
relieve him of the necessity of complying with the rules. (Em-
phasis and omissions mine.)
2. Review When Objection Not Timely Made
a. Late filing of affidavit when judge not available within the cir-
cuit. In Peoples National Bank v. Manos Brothers, Inc.51 the Su-
preme Court held that the failure of the parties to file an affidavit
that no judge was within the circuit before arguing the case before
the judge of the adjoining circuit was not jurisdictional, and could
be cured by filing such affidavit nunc pro tunc. When one party
made no objection to the late filing until after the judge had ren-
dered his decree, the Supreme Court held that the objection came
too late, distinguishing this case from In re Bowen52 where objection
to a non-filing of such affidavit had been timely made.
b. Prejudicial Remarks of Judge. In Brown v. Singletary-3 the
trial judge inadvertently failed to excuse the jury while comment-
ing on the evidence in ruling on defendant's request for directing a
verdict. Conceiving that his remarks might have been prejudicial
to plaintiff, he called the matter to the attention of plaintiff's coun-
sel. Plaintiff's counsel made no objection until after the jury had
found for the defendant, whereupon plaintiff moved for and was
granted a new trial by the trial judge.
Defendant appealed to the Supreme Court which reversed the
order for a new trial on the ground that plaintiff should have ob-
jected when given the opportunity to do so, saying:
Not having done so, he cannot take his chances of a successful
issue, reserving vices in the trial, of which he has notice, for
use in case of disappointment in the result.
3. Instructions to the Jury
In Hall v. Walters54 plaintiff sued a labor union and certain of
its officials for conspiracy in assault and battery upon him, and the
trial judge instructed the jury on conspiracy and respondeat superior.
Defendants did not object, but appealed to the Supreme Court which
said:
51. 226 S.C. 257, 84 S.E. 2d 857 (1954).
52. 186 S.C. 125, 195 S.E. 253 (1938).
53. 85 S.E. 2d 738 (S.C. 1955).
54. 85 S.E. 2d 729 (S.C. 1955).
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Act No. 27 of Feb. 20, 1953, 48 Stat. 28 provides that after the
Court shall have charged the jury, they shall be excused and
in their absence counsel may enter objections to the charge or
request additional instructions. That procedure was carefully
followed in the trial of this case, after the jury had been in-
structed on the law of conspiracy and also the union's liability
respondeat superior, whereupon it was incunbent upon counsel to
object to the charge in that respect in order to save Mhe point
for appeal, which was not done in this case although expressly
solicited by the Court. It is, therefore, not now available to ap-
pellants. (Emphasis mine.)
In Munn v. Asseff55 the court again had occasion to apply the
1953 Act relating to exceptions to the charge:
Orderly procedure requires that objections be timely made ....
• . . It has already been pointed out that appellant was given
ample opportunity to object to the charge of the law, or to re-
quest additional propositions, and expressed satisfaction with
the charge. The many cases decided by this Court to the effect
that there is an obligation on counsel to assist the Court by re-
questing additional charges or amplification, now finds legisla-
tive support and sanction in Act No. 27 ....
Before this act it was customary for trial judges to ask counsel
after the charge if there were additional requests, but it was
not covered by rule or statute. Submitting the question in the
absence of the jury allows counsel to more fully discuss the
law and freely express his views and accordingly, increases his
responsibility . ...
... We conclude that having failed to request amplification of
the charge, complaint may not now be made . . . . (Omissions
mine.)
The statute was again applied in Richardson v. Register56 where
the defendant, although given the opportunity to do so, failed to
object at the conclusion of the charge.
In Belue v. City of Greenville57 plaintiff secured judgment against
the defendant for water damage to plaintiff's property. The judge
charged the jury on future damages to which defendant failed to ob-
ject. Although the statute above noted was not cited, the Supreme
Court, speaking of the charge, said:
55. 226 S.C. 54, 83 S.E. 2d 642 (1954).
56. 87 S.E. 2d 40 (S.C. 1954).
57. 226 S.C. 192, 84 S.E. 2d 631 (1954).
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This view was expressly stated by the presiding Judge in his
charge to the jury; and if appellant construed it as a misstate-
ment of the issues, the matter should have been brought to the
attention of the trial judge at that time. This not having been
done, appellant's present contention cannot now be considered.
See also Marthers v. Hurst5 8 where the court held that a defen-
dant who undertook to handle his own case, but missed the trial and
suffered a judgment, could not on appeal object that the trial judge
failed to charge certain matters where no request therefor was sub-
mitted to the court by the defendant.
4. Other Matters
In Evans v. Evans59 plaintiff filed exceptions to the Master's re-
port. Three months thereafter, defendant served notice on plaintiff
that he would move before the court for trial, "on issues raised by
plaintiff's exceptions". Later the case was submitted to the trial
court on briefs, without oral argument, and defendant in his brief,
for the first time, raised the point that the plaintiff's exception to
the Master's report was too general to justify a review of the case.
The Supreme Court held that the objection came too late.
. . . we are of the opinion that appellant was not in a position
to raise the question of insufficiency of the exception for the
first time, in his brief, and that his conduct relative thereto was
such as to amount to a waiver of the question of its form.
In Munn v. Asseff,60 supra, the court said:
Having failed to raise objection by demurrer, or motion to strike,
or by answer, and having failed to move for a non suit or di-
rected verdict as to actual damages, or object to the charge of
the law, the first four points which appellant now seeks to make
could not be raised by a motion for a new trial on circuit nor in
this Court. After the verdict appellant may not change his en-
tire theory. Orderly procedure required that objection be timely
made.
5. Orders Not Appealable
In Thomas & Howard Co. v. Fowler61 defendants appealed an
order requiring them to make their counterclaim more definite and
58. 86 S.E. 2d 581 (S.C. 1955).
59. 85 S.E. 2d 726 (S.C. 1955).
60. See note 55 supra.
61. 225 S.C. 354, 82 S.R. 2d 454 (1954).
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certain by setting out certain information which was wholly within
their knowledge. The Supreme Court said:
'It is sometimes difficult to determine whether an order grant-
ing or refusing a motion to make a pleading more definite and
certain deprives a party of some substantial right so as to make
it appealable before final judgment'.
It held, however, that the order in the instant case was not appealable
and dismissed it on the grounds that there was no showing that sub-
stantial rights of the appellant were invaded by the order.
In Gardner v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Association62
defendant appealed from an order of the lower court denying its mo-
tion to strike certain allegations of the plaintiff's complaint. The
Supreme Court, after noting ". . . the question of whether or not
the order under review is appealable was not raised and hence not
before the court", affirmed the order of the lower court without spe-
cifically deciding whether or not the order under review was appeal-
able.
6. Review of Facts in Equity Cases
In Forester v. Forester63 plaintiff sued her husband for separate
support and maintenance, which the lower court allowed. The hus-
band appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed the lower court,
saying:
'We have jurisdiction in appeals in equity to find the facts in
accord with our view of the preponderance or greater weight of
the evidence, in the absence of verdict by jury.' . . . In Wise v.
Wise ... which involved the same issues as the case at hand, it
was concluded . .. 'Whatever differences of opinion may once
have existed as to the rule which should govern where an appel-
lant, as in this case, asks this court to reverse the findings of fact
by the circuit judge in an equity case, it must now . . . be
regarded as settled that this court may reverse the findings of
fact by the circuit court when the appellant satisfies this court
that the preponderance of the evidence is against the findings of
the circuit court'. (Citations omitted.)
7. Review of Findings of Master Concurred in by Circuit Judge
In Miller v. Miller64 the circuit judge concurred in the findings of
the Master that the wife was entitled to separate maintenance. The
Supreme Court said:
62. 226 S.C. 219, 84 S.E. 2d 637 (1954).
63. 226 S.C. 311, 85 S.E. 2d 187 (1954).
64. 225 S.C. 119, 82 S.E. 2d 119 (1954).
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On this appeal there must be applied the well settled rule that
in an equity case, findings of fact by a Master or referee, con-
curred in by a circuit judge, will not be disturbed by this court
unless it appears such findings are without evidentiary support
or are against the clear preponderance of the evidence.
See also Peoples National Bank v. Manos Brothers Inc.65 where
the court again applied the rule that such concurrent findings "will
not be disturbed unless they are without support in the evidence or
are against the clear preponderance of the evidence."
In Royal Crown Bottling Company, Inc. v. Chandler6 6 the appeal
chief ly involved a controversy between the parties as to the amount of
attorneys' fees which were owing for services rendered in a tax refund
case. The Circuit Court had confirmed the referee's findings that
there was a contract between plaintiffs and respondents, their coun-
sel, providing for attorneys' fees of 20% of the recovery. On appeal
by the attorneys the Supreme Court reversed the findings of the
Master and circuit judge as to the amount of attorneys' fees to be
paid on the ground that the findings below were against the prepon-
derance of the evidence.
8. Review of Claim That Damage Excessive
In Nelson v. Charleston and Western Carolina Railway Co.
67
a new trial was ordered on other grounds, but answering appellant's
contention that damages awarded below were excessive, the Supreme
Court said:
... this court will not undertake to set aside a verdict because
its amount is such as to indicate merely undue liberality on the
part of the jury. The power in such case to set it aside, or re-
duce it by granting new trial nisi, rests with the trial judge
alone. It is only when the verdict is so grossly excessive as to
indicate that the jury was moved by passion or prejudice or
other considerations not founded on the evidence and the instruc-
tions of the trial court that it becomes the duty of this court,
as well as the trial court, to set it aside absolutely.
In Hall v. Walters,68 where defendant union and union officials
contended that excessive punitive damages had been awarded plain-
tiff in his suit for assault and battery, the Supreme Court said:
... We cannot say that the amount of the verdict in this case is
65. 226 S.C. 257, 84 S.E. 2d 857 (1954).
66. 226 S.C. 94, 83 S.E. 2d 745 (1954).
67. 86 S.E. 2d 56 (S.C. 1955).
68. 85 S.E. 2d 729 (S.C. 1955).
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such as to shock the conscience of the court or to show that it
was the result of prejudice, passion, or other improper motive,
in the absence of which this court will not reverse. (Emphasis
mine.)
C. STTAI.MENT OV RECORD VOR APPEAL.
In Peoples National Bank v. Manos Brothers, Inc.6 9 appellant ob-
jected that the lower court, in settling the record for appeal, required
the inclusion in the "Statement" of a paragraph which appellant
charged was argumentative in support of the lower court's judgment,
and thereby violated Rule 4, Section 3, of the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court overruled the objection, saying:
While the paragraph above quoted is not strictly 'necessary to a
proper understanding and decision of the questions to be decid-
ed', it does not materially encumber the record, and no prejudice
by reason of its inclusion has been shown. In the exercise of
his judgment settling the appeal record the circuit judge is en-
titled to reasonable latitude.
69. 226 S.C. 257, 84 S.E. 2d 857 (1954).
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